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I. INTRODUCTION
The area of dispute resolution has historically relied on the human
element of negotiation and mediation. Through the recent developments
in the computer field a program has been developed to aid in dispute
resolution.' This program, Policy/Goal Percentaging (hereinafter P/G%)
allows disputants to see the results of alternative proposals based on
the criteria of their respective positions. This program facilitates max-
imizing compromises even above the expected ideal positions.
The program is called Policy/Goal Percentaging because it relates
alternatives (policies) to criteria (goals) using either part or whole
percentaging (percent determining) to measure outcomes where the goals
are of different dimensions. The program is designed to process a set
of (1) goals to be achieved, (2) alternatives for achieving them, and (3)
relations between -goals and alternatives. This will allow disputants to
choose the best alternative or combination of alternatives for maximizing
benefits minus the costs to the disputants or others. P/G% is a form
of expert systems software which seeks to include the logic which
successful decision-makers and mediators possess. 2 Additionally, P/G%
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1. For details concerning Policy/Goal Percentaging, see also S. NAGEL, MICROCOM-
PUTERS AS DECISION-MAKING AIDS IN LAW PRACTICE (1985); Nagel, Part/Whole Per-
centaging as a Useful Tool in Policy/Program Evaluation, 8 EVALUATION AND PROGRAM
PLANNING 107 (1985). The program is available from Stuart Nagel, Decision-Aids, Inc.,
1720 Parkhaven Drive, Champaign, IL 61820.
2. Literature on expert systems software includes F. HAYES-ROTH, D. WATERMAN, &
D. LENAT, BUILDING EXPERT SYSTEMS (1983); D. HUNT, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND
EXPERT SYSTEMS (1986); T. NAGY, D. GAULT, & M. NAGY, BUILDING YOUR FIRST
EXPERT SYSTEM (1985).
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is a multi-criteria decision-making system (hereinafter MCDM) in that
it works with multiple goals, satisfying the participants by allowing
concessions on each side on different goals. The MCDM perspective
also facilitates new goals and alternatives which both sides can use to
reach an agreement. 3
The P/G% program can facilitate either individual problem solving
or dispute resolution. It can facilitate dispute resolution through nego-
tiation, mediation, or adjudication. The emphasis in this article will be
on dispute resolution through microcomputer-facilitated negotiation and
mediation using the example of the dispute of providing legal services
for the underprivileged. This example will be helpful in understanding
(1) how to determine initial alternatives, criteria, and relations, (2) how
to attempt to resolve deadlocks by weighting the criteria and averaging
the alternatives, (3) how to determine what is necessary to convince the
other side, (4) how to resolve deadlocks by adding alternatives, (5) how
to identify the concept of optimizing compromise as a goal to seek in
dispute resolution, and (6) how various other means can be used for
achieving optimizing compromises.
This article is concerned with disputes over public policy in social
problems. In such circumstances, the disputants are likely to be both
liberal and conservative policy-makers, generally serving in a legislative
body. They could also be associated with administrative agencies, courts,
interest groups, or political parties. Examples could be taken from the
public policy fields that relate to environmental protection, poverty,
criminal justice, and other social problems.
At the outset, one should clarify that the concept of dispute requires
persons, groups, ideologies, or other entities to be in conflict over how
a matter should be resolved. A problem is not necessarily a dispute,
since it may only involve one person or entity trying to decide what to
do. The major processes whereby disputes are resolved are through forms
of negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or adjudication. In negotiation,
the two or more sides interact to try to come to an agreement, which
may be considered mutually desirable or may be forced by one party
on the other through threats of negative sanctions. In mediation, a non-
disputant tries to bring or force the disputants to reach an agreement.
If the non-disputants have the power to impose a solution on the parties,
then they are generally referred to as arbitrators where chosen by the
parties, or as judges where the non-disputants are imposed on the parties.
Mediators generally seek solutions that will be considered mutually
3. Literature on multi-criteria decision-making includes C. HWANG & K. YOON,
MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTE DECISION MAKING: METHODS AND APPLICATIONS (1981); M. ZE-
LENY, MULTIPLE CRITERIA DECISION MAKING (1981); R. STEUER, MULTIPLE CRITERIA
OPTIMIZATION: THEORY, COMPUTATION, AND APPLICATION (1986); S. NAGEL, EVALU-
ATION ANALYSIS WITH MICROCOMPUTERS (1987).
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satisfying by the parties. Arbitrators and judges seek solutions that are
considered correct in accordance with a body of past practice, common
sense, or rules, and the solutions may not be mutually satisfying. Ar-
bitrators as compared to judges tend to place more emphasis on past
custom and less on past recorded cases. They also place more emphasis
on uncodified common sense and less emphasis on codified rules.
4
This article is organized in terms of the following ideas:
1. In resolving disputes through the multi-criteria decision-making
of the P/G% program, one needs to indicate:
(a) the alternatives from which to choose;
(b) the criteria for judging the alternatives;
(c) how the alternatives relate to the criteria; and
(d) recognition that all three elements may be subject to change.
2. If clarifying the alternatives, criteria, and relations results in a
deadlock or continued dispute, then MCDM and P/G% may be
able to resolve the dispute through the following means:
(a) averaging the alternatives with or without weighting the
criteria;
(b) determining what it would take to convince the other side;
and/or
(c) adding a new alternative.
3. The idea of an optimizing compromise or a win-plus solution
where each side comes out ahead of its original best expectations
can be illustrated by:
(a) the dispute over how to provide legal service to the poor;
(b) criminal and civil litigation;
(c) other legal policy controversies such as sentencing, pre-trial
release, and housing for the poor; and/or
(d) legislative redistricting.
4. For details concerning various aspects of negotiation, see also H. RAIFFA, THE ART
AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); G. NIERENBERG, FUNDAMENTALS ON NEGOTI-
ATING (1973). Many of the ideas contained in the Nierenberg book have been incorporated
into a computer program which emphasizes relevant checklists. The program is available
from Roy Nierenberg, Experience in Software, Inc., 2039 Shattuck Avenue, Suite 401,
Berkeley, CA 94704. For another microcomputer program relevant to facilitating nego-
tiation, see Winter, An Application of Computerized Decision Tree Models in Management-
Union Bargaining, 15 INTERFACES 74 (1985).
For details concerning arbitration, see DOMKE COMM. ARBITRATION (Wilner rev. ed.
1986); F. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (1981); F. KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBI-
TRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1948). These books contain
useful comparisons of arbitration and adjudication including commercial, labor, family,
and international arbitration, including civil, criminal, and appellate adjudication.
For a broader treatment of alternative methods of dispute resolution, see also S. VAGO,
LAW AND SOCIETY (1981); R. KIDDER, CONNECTING LAW AND SOCIETY (1983); L.
MAYERS, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES BY JUDICIAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, MILITARY, AND ARBITRAL TRIBNUNALS
(1955). For even broader ideas on resolving disputes, see L. RUBY, LOGIC: AN INTRo-
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4. Microcomputer-based procedures for resolving disputes can be
generalized to cover:
(a) changing alternatives;
(b) changing the criteria;
(c) changing the relations; and/or
(d) using P/G% to decide among the methods for resolving
disputes.'
II. DETERMINING THE INITIAL ALTERNATIVES, CRITERIA, AND
RELATIONS
A. The Alternatives
The basic alternatives in the public policy dispute over how to provide
legal services to the poor are a volunteer system or a program of salaried
government lawyers. The Reagan Administration has repeatedly proposed
that legal services for the poor should be provided by volunteer lawyers
with no federal appropriation. Congress voted in favor of salaried gov-
ernment lawyers working for the Legal Services Corporation. 6 Interest-
ingly, the disputants generally agree on (1) the conflicting alternatives,
(2) the basic criteria for determining the best alternative, and (3) the
manner in which to score on each criterion. They disagree, however, on
which alternative is best, largely because they disagree on the relative
importance of the various criteria. Until recently, they have not ade-
quately explored dispute-resolving alternatives.7
Other methods exist which provide legal services to the poor in
addition to programs of government lawyers or volunteer attorneys.
DUCTION (1950); J. BURNHAM & P. WHEELRIGHT, PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS (1932).
These two books include literature on the logic of resolving dilemmas.
5. On application of Policy/Goal Percentaging to facilitate judicial and arbitral decisions
based on prior precedents or instances, see Nagel, Using Microcomputers and P/G% to
Predict Court Cases, 18 AKRON L. REV. 541 (1985); Nagel, Microcomputers and Improving
Social Science Prediction, 10 EVALUATION REV. 635 (1986). On the application of Policy/
Goal Percentaging to facilitate arbitration and judicial decisions that are based on evaluating
consequences, see S. NAGEL, PUBLIC POLICY: GOALS, MEANS, AND METHODS (1984).
6. On the conflict between the Reagan White House and the Congress over the Legal
Services Corporation, see Caplan, Understanding the Controversy Over the Legal Services
Corporation, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 583 (1983); Hannon, The New Legal Services
Corporation: This Is Independence?, 9 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 412 (1984); Kaegler, The
Legal Services Corporation: Past, Present, and Future, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 593
(1983); Turner, President Reagan and the Legal Services Corporation, 15 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 711 (1982).
7. On the alternative ways of providing legal services for the poor in general, see
Legal Services Corp., The Delivery System Study: A Policy Report to the Congress and
the President of the United States (1980); LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE POOR: CASES AND
MATERIAL (1975); E. JARMEL, LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR (1972); RESEARCH
ON LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR AND THE DISADVANTAGED: LESSON FROM THE PAST
AND ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE (B. Garth ed. 1983); Delivery of Legal Services, II LAW
AND SOC. REV. 1 (1976).
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Another approach, that at one time was considered an important third
alternative, is a Jiidicare system. Under this system, designated lawyers
would represent the poor while the government would pay the expenses
incurred in accordance with a fee schedule. This is analogous to the
Medicare system for providing medical services to the poor. Judicare
has been rejected by conservatives as too expensive and rejected by
liberals as only covering routine case handling, with no organized law-
reform elements.
Each of the basic alternatives has a number of variations. The
volunteer system, for example, could involve (1) mandatory volunteering
in order to renew one's license, although mandatory volunteering sounds
contradictory; (2) volunteering with substantial federal funds to coor-
dinate and train the volunteers; and (3) volunteering to handle cases
for a fee similar to the handling of federal criminal cases for indigent
defendants.8 The salaried government program has such variations as
(1) a program that is restricted to routine cases with no suing of
government officials, no law reform, and no research back-up agencies;
(2) a program that is subject to being vetoed by local politicians and
bar officials which may thereby limit its independence, (3) a circuit-
riding program designed to cover a wide territory with lawyers being
present in different places on different days, (4) a program that combines
civil and criminal cases, and (5) a program that emphasizes law reform
with routine cases being handled through a Judicare system.9 The
Judicare system has such variations as (1) not allowing clients to go to
any lawyer, but just to certain firms that have a contract with the
federal government to represent poor people, (2) a reimbursement system
with or without fee control, and (3) private sector lawyers only for
certain types of cases, only in desolate geographical areas, or with other
restrictions.10
8. On the volunteer system for providing legal services for the poor, see D. ROSENTHAL,
R. KAGAN, & D. QUATRONE, VOLUNTEER ATTORNEYS AND LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE
POOR: NEW YoRKs CLO PROGRAM (1971); Nussbaum, Attorney's Fee in Public Interest
Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 301 (1973); J. HANDLER, E. HOLLINGSWORTH, & H.
ERLANGER, LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS (1978); Maddi & Merrill,
The Private Practicing Bar and Legal Services for Low-Income People, American Bar
Foundation Series on Legal Services for the Poor (1971); Abel, Law Without Politics:
Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. REV. 474; Maher & Turza, Is
Mandatory Pro Bono a Good Idea?, 8 BAR LEADER 18 (1983).
9. On the system of salaried government lawyers for the poor, see J. HANDLER & L.
WELLS, NEIGHBORHOOD LEGAL SERVICES: NEW DIMENSIONS IN THE LAW, (1966); The
O.E.O. Legal Services Program, 14 CATH. LAW. 99 (1968); Lowenstein & Waggoner,
Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 805 (1967); Legal Services: Guides, Law, Regulations, POVERTY LAW REPORTER
8000 (1972); H. STUMPF, COMMUNITY POLITICS AND LEGAL SERVICES: THE OTHER SIDE
OF THE LAW (1975); A. CHAMPAGNE, LEGAL SERVICES: AN EXPLANATORY STUDY OF
EFFECTIVENESS (1976).
10. For information concerning the Judicare system, see S. BRAKEL, JUDICARE: PUBLIC
FUNDS, PRIVATE LAWYERS, AND POOR PEOPLE (1974); Brakel, Prospects of Private Bar
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In this article, partly as a form of shorthand, the position which
favors a system of volunteer attorneys will be referred to as the con-
servative position, while favoring of a system of salaried government
attorneys will be referred to as the liberal position. The conservative
position has internal diversity, since volunteer systems can range from
traditional legal aid with no government incentives to heavily funded
volunteer systems with compensation for volunteering or sanctions for
not volunteering. The conservative position, however, mainly refers to
traditional legal aid. Likewise the liberal position has internal diversity,
since salaried government attorneys can range from attorneys who are
or are not restricted to routine civil cases with no research back-up,
appellate capacity, legislative drafting or testifying, group representation,
or government defendants. The liberal position, however, includes as
many of those activities as can be authorized."
B. The Criteria
The basic criteria of providing legal advice to the indigent are:
1. Inexpensiveness. Both liberals and conservatives favor inexpen-
siveness or efficiency. If quality legal services can be provided
for $100 million, then $150 million should not be spent. There
may be disagreement as to what should be done with the extra
$50 million. Neither side, however, would favor spending $150
million for what could be obtained for only $100 million.
2. Accessibility. The program should be accessible and visible to
poor people. If one is interested in having a legal services program
for the poor, then it should be a program that will be used and
not one that is relatively unknown and/or especially difficult to
make use of.
Involvement in Legal Services, 66 A.B.A. J. 726 (1980); Cole & Greenberger, Staff
Attorneys vs. Judicare: A Cost Analysis, 50 U. DET. J. URB. L. 705 (1973); Goodman
& Feuillan, The Trouble with Judicare, 58 A.B.A. J. 476 (1972); Zander, Judicare or
Staff) A British View, 64 A.B.A. J. 436 (1978).
11. For alternatives for providing legal services to indigent defendants in criminal
cases, see D. OAKS & W. LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT:
A STUDY OF CHICAGO AND COOK COUNTY (1968); L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE
POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS (1965); J. TAYLOR, T. STANLEY,
B. DEFLORIO & L. SEEKAMP, A COMPARISON OF COUNSEL FOR FELONY DEFENDANTS
(1972); Nagel, Effects of Alternative Types of Counsel on Criminal Procedure Treatment,
48 IND. L.J. 404 (1973); Wice & Suwak, Current Realities of Public Defender Programs:
A National Survey and Analysis, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 161 (1974).
For non-American alternatives for providing legal services for the poor, see ACCESS
TO JUSTICE: A WORLD SURVEY (M. Capelletti & B. Garth ed. 1978); INNOVATIONS IN
THE LEGAL SERVICES (E. Blankenberg & H. Meier ed. 1980); LEGAL REPRESENTATION
OF THE POOR (E. Jarmel ed. 1972); PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL AID: AN INTERNATIONAL
STUDY (F. Zemans ed. 1979); WINDSOR YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE (Recueil
Annuel de Windsor, D'Access a la Justice, Univ. of Windsor, Faculty of Law, 1981-85).
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3. Political Feasibility. The program should be capable of first
getting through Congress, and second, not being vetoed by the
president or capable of surviving a veto through a two-thirds
Congressional vote.
4. Competency. The attorneys in the program should be reasonably
competent. They should be capable of going to court, if necessary,
to provide adequate representation to their clients.
Additional criteria could be added, but they are not likely to resolve
the dispute. For example, liberals might include accountability as an
additional criterion. On the other hand, conservatives might add the
importance of accountability to local officials as a criterion. Those two
criteria tend to offset each other since accountability to the poor tends
to favor salaried government lawyers, whereas accountability to local
officials tends to favor a volunteer system, especially one run by local
bar associations.
The question of how a problem is dealt with if some of the disputants
do not accept the basic criteria as being relevant has been raised. For
example, some people who are opposed to legal services for the poor
as an inherently trouble-making activity, like the program more if it is
less accessible and the 'attorneys are incompetent. Such people, however,
are a small segment of the opposition to salaried government lawyers.
They do not need to be given substantial consideration. The President
has indicated that he is not opposed to the idea of legal services for
the poor even in the form of accessible competent legal services. But
he opposes legal services that are provided through salaried government
lawyers.
Where two or more sides differ not just in the weight they give to
the criteria but also on what criteria they use, this creates no special
problems for multi-criteria decision-making. One merely analyzes each
offer and counter-offer in light of the conservative, liberal, or other
criteria, using different criteria. Table 1, for example, would thus show
different criteria on row B for conservatives than the criteria shown on
row C for liberals. The object is still the same, namely to find an
alternative that both sides will consider to have a high overall score in
light of their respective criteria, regardless of what those criteria are.
Therefore, an alternative may be determined which will be acceptable
to both liberals and conservatives.
C. The Relations
Table 1A shows how the two alternatives score on the four criteria.
Each criterion involves a simple 1-2 scale, where 1 means relatively
low, and 2 means relatively high. The scoring of the relations between
the alternatives and the criteria are as follows:
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I. Inexpensiveness. The volunteer system is clearly less expensive
than a system of salaried government lawyers.
2. Accessibility. The salaried government lawyer in the context of
the Legal Services Corporation is especially accessible by way
of storefront neighborhood law offices. Volunteer legal aid has
traditionally been relatively inaccessible because of the difficult
procedures for accessing the volunteer attorneys. For example,
in Champaign County, Illinois before the Legal Services Cor-
poration (LSC), poor people would phone the United Fund and
be referred to the office of the Bar Association. They would
then be referred to the chairperson of the Legal Aid Committee
who would refer them to a member of the Committee who might
be unavailable or who would refer them to law students in their
office. The system processed about fifty cases a year before LSC,
which was almost immediately processing about 100 cases per
week due largely to increased visibility and accessibility.
3. Political Feasibility. The volunteer system is more politically
feasible in the sense that no one in Congress is likely to object
to attorneys volunteering to help poor people. On the other hand,
there are objections to paying government salaries to such at-
torneys, especially if they spend a substantial amount of time
developing test cases and new legal policies concerning the legal
rights of the poor against landlords, merchants, employers, and
TABLE 1
Volunteer Versus Salaried Legal Services
A. WITH UNWEIGHTED CRITERIA
Inexpens Accessib Polit.Fe Competen
Volunteer 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
Salaried G 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00
B. WITH CONSERVATIVE-WEIGHTED CRITERIA
Inexpens Accessib Polit.Fe Competen
Volunteer 4.00 1.00 4.00 1.00
Salaried G 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
C. WITH LIBERAL WEIGHTED CRITERIA
Inexpens Accessib Polit.Fe Competen
Volunteer 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Salaried G 1.00 4.00 1.00 4.00
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government officials, as contrasted to more routine family-oriented
legal-aid matters.
4. Competency. The salaried system tends to generate more com-
petent attorneys who work full-time in the field of poverty law.
The volunteer system tends to bring out new attorneys who are
looking for experience, or older attorneys who are trying to be
helpful, but who are not as knowledgeable about poverty law
matters.
One might object to using a scale of relatively low and relatively
high for measuring how the alternatives score on the criteria. Such a
scale has the advantage of simplicity for better understanding the dispute-
resolution methodology. There is no need to use more complex meas-
urement if simple measurement will achieve the same results. The
analysis of the data will make clear that a virtual deadlock would still
exist between conservatives and liberals on the volunteer system versus
the salaried government system. This is so even if expensiveness were
measured in exact dollars; accessibility measured in average miles from
the poverty population to participating law offices, or in terms of
awareness scores on the part of the potential clients; political feasibility
measured in terms of the percentage of House or Senate members who
would be likely to vote for allowing the alternatives to exist; and
competency by average LSAT scores, grade point averages, bar exam
scores, years of relevant experience, aggessiveness, or other measures
of attorney competence in this context. The results would still be that
those with conservative values would support the volunteer system,
because it would score higher on inexpensiveness and political feasibility.
Likewise, those with liberal values would still support the salaried
government system because it would score higher on accessibility and
competency. These results relate to the definition and empirical nature
of volunteer attorneys and government salaried attorneys.
III. THE MAJOR APPROACHES FOR RESOLVING DEADLOCKS
A. Weighting the Criteria and Averaging the Alternatives
Table 1A shows that with those four criteria and with the reasonable
scoring of the alternatives a deadlock of six points for each alternative
exists. At first glance one might think the tie could be broken and the
dispute resolved by recognizing that the criteria should not all receive
equal weight. Table 1B uses conservative weights. Such weights put
relatively more emphasis on inexpensiveness and political feasibility.
Doing so means doubling the scores on those two criteria to show those
criteria have more importance than accessibility and competency. Doing
so in Table 1B shows that the volunteer system receives ten points, and
the salaried system receives only eight points from a conservative
perspective.
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Table 1 C uses liberal weights. Such weights put more emphasis on
accessibility and competency. Doing so means doubling the score on
those two criteria to show they are more important than inexpensiveness
and political feasibility. Table 1 C then shows the volunteer system
receives only eight points, and the salaried system receives ten points.
The average of the conservative ten and the liberal eight for the volunteer
system is nine. Likewise, if the conservative eight and the liberal ten
for the salaried system are averaged, an average of nine is obtained.
Thus, weighting the criteria does not resolve the deadlock. (It might
have done so if liberals were to like the salaried system more than the
conservatives like the volunteer system, or vice versa, assuming liberals
and conservatives have an equal say in this controversy.) In this situation,
however, their value weights are diametrically opposed in both direction
and magnitude.
The results of the weighting explain that a person with conservative
values is likely to prefer the volunteer over the salaried system for
providing legal services to the poor. Also, if one has liberal values, one
is likely to prefer salaried over volunteer lawyers for these same services.
It might, therefore, be concluded that systematic policy analysis is a
sham, especially with microcomputers, because its results depend on
one's values. This legal services dispute, however, will show the success
of systematic policy analysis.
B. Determining What is Needed to Convince the Other Side
Another way of resolving such disputes in addition to the system of
weighting and averaging is to have one side convince the other side to
adopt the other position. The P/G% system is especially helpful in
showing what changes are needed in the scoring of the relations or the
weighting of the goals in order to move the liberals to adopt the volunteer
system or the conservatives to adopt the salaried system.
Table 2A shows what would have to be done to bring the salaried
system up to the level of the volunteer system, given the conservative
values. Table IB previously showed that the salaried system receives a
score of eight. Thus, there is a two point gap that the liberals need to
account for to convince the conservatives that the salaried system is as
desirable as the volunteer system. Table 2A shows twelve ways that
gap could theoretically be closed. Reading down the columns the al-
ternatives are:
1. Inexpensiveness.
a. The volunteer system receives a "no" on inexpensiveness.
b. The salaried system receives a "yes" on inexpensiveness.
c. Inexpensiveness receives a weight of zero.
Any one of those three changes would generate a tie by bringing the
volunteer system from a score of ten to an eight as in possibility la,
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by bringing the salaried system from a score of eight to a ten as in
possibility lb, or by bringing both down to a score of six as in possibility
Ic. All three possibilities, however, are quite unrealistic. Conservatives
are not going to perceive that the volunteer system is really an expensive
system, or that the salaried system is an inexpensive one, or that
inexpensiveness is of no importance.
2. Accessibility.
a. The volunteer system receives a negative one on accessibility,
but that is impossible since the scale only goes as low as
one and as high as two.
b. The salaried system receives a four on accessibility, which
is also impossible.
c. Accessibility receives a weight of three. That is not impossible.
However, it is unlikely that accessibility would receive more
weight than inexpensiveness and political feasibility in the
values of conservatives.
3. Political Feasibility. There are three possibilities here. They are
the same unrealistic possibilities as were previously discussed under
inexpensiveness.
4. Competency. There are also three possibilities here. They are the
same impossible and unlikely possibilities discussed under
accessibility.
Table 2B shows what it would take to bring the volunteer system
up to the level of the salaried system given liberal values. Table 1C
previously showed that with the liberal weights, the salaried system
receives a score of ten and the volunteer system receives a score of
eight. Thus, there is a two point gap that the conservatives need to fill
to convince the liberals that the volunteer system is as good as the
salaried system. Table 2B shows twelve ways that gap could theoretically
be made up. Those ways reading down the columns are:
1. Inexpensiveness.
a. The volunteer system receives a four on inexpensiveness.
That, however, is beyond the one, two scale.
b. The salaried system receives a negative one on inexpensive-
ness. That, however, is also beyond the one, two scale.
c. Inexpensiveness receives a weight of three. It is, however,
unlikely that inexpensiveness will receive more weight than
accessibility or competency in the values of liberals.
2. Accessibility.
a. The volunteer system receives a two on accessibility. Liberals,
however, are not going to perceive that the volunteer system
scores are as high as possible on accessibility.
b. The salaried system receives a one on accessibility. Liberals,
however, are not going to perceive that the salaried system
scores as low as possible on accessibility.
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c. Accessibility receives a weight of zero, but liberals are not
going to agree that accessibility is of no importance.
3. Political Feasibility. There are three possibilities here. They are
the same impossible and unlikely possibilities discussed under
inexpensiveness.
4. Competency. There are also three possibilities here. They are the
same unrealistic possibilities discussed under accessibility.
TABLE 2
What It Would Take To Convince The Other Side
A. BRINGING THE SALARIED SYSTEM UP TO THE LEVEL OF
THE VOLUNTEER SYSTEM GIVEN CONSERVATIVE VALUES
Inexpens Accessib Polit.Fe Competen
Volunteer 1.00 -1.00 1.00 -1.00
Salaried 2.00 4.00 2.00 4.00
Weight -0.000 3.000 -0.000 3.000
B. BRINGING THE VOLUNTEER SYSTEM UP TO THE LEVEL OF
THE SALARIED SYSTEM GIVEN LIBERAL VALUES
Inexpens Accessib Polit.Fe Competen
Volunteer 4.00 2.00 4.00 2.00
Salaried -1.00 1.00 -1.00 1.00
Weight 3.000 0.000 3.000 0.000
Thus the probability seems low that liberals could convince conserv-
atives to accept salaried legal services, or that conservatives could
convince liberals to accept a volunteer system. The kind of sensitivity
analysis shown in Table 2, however, is often helpful in indicating to
disputants what they should emphasize in order to convince the other
side as to their positions. This is a sensitivity analysis in the sense that
it shows how sensitive the conclusion is to various changes in the weights
of the criteria and the relations between alternatives and goals. Coin-
cidentally, all of the threshold or break-even values shown in Table 2
are either conceptually impossible to obtain, or they are empirically
unrealistic. Thus, the deadlock is not likely to be resolved by one side
convincing the other.
C. Resolving Deadlocks by Adding an Alternative
A third alternative that has been discussed in the past is a Judicare
system analagous to Medicare or Medicaid whereby poor people would
go to existing private sector lawyers who would then be compensated
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by the federal government. That alternative, however, is not a compro-
mise in the sense of being a second-choice to the volunteer system for
conservatives, or to the salaried system for liberals. Instead, it is a
possible third choice for both sides. Conservatives now reject the Judicare
system because it is substantially more expensive than salaried legal
services. The Legal Services Corporation program tends to pay an
attorney an annual salary of about $25,000 for which they process
numerous cases, including as many as 300 divorces a year. If each case
were handled by a private sector lawyer at approximately $300 apiece,
that would be $90,000 just for divorce cases. Liberals reject the Judicare
system because it tends to handle only routine cases, such as family
law cases. Salaried legal services attorneys tend to look for precedent-
setting test cases that will have high leverage in developing the legal
rights of the poor.
Returning to Table 1A stimulates suggestions of deadlock-resolving
alternatives. They would enhance the existing salaried Legal Services
Corporation, as contrasted with a whole new system. Whatever results
from the existing LSC program should seek to reduce the expensiveness
of salaried government lawyers, and improve upon their political fea-
sibility, two criteria which salaried attorneys lack. Likewise, whatever
is built on the existing LSC program should seek to improve upon the
lack of. accessibility of volunteer attorneys and their relative lack of
competency, since those are the two criteria on which volunteer attorneys
admittedly are weakest.
In 1982, Professor Gerald Caplan of George Washington University
was appointed Acting Director of the Legal Services Corporation. He
was an excellent compromise for a number of reasons. He could appeal
to liberals as one of the founders of the original Legal Services Program
of the Office of Economic Opportunity under Lyndon Johnson, and a
professor with credentials in both law and social science. He could
appeal to conservatives as having been a leader in developing anti-crime
policy in the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration under Richard
Nixon and Gerald Ford. Caplan accepted the position only temporarily
to salvage what was left of the LSC as a result of the dispute between
the White House and Congress.
Partially following the reasoning suggested by the above analysis of
Table 1A and others, Gerald Caplan proposed to require that all Legal
Services Agencies spend ten percent of their budgets for the development
of a meaningful volunteer system. The money would be used mainly
for two purposes. The first purpose would be to make volunteers more
accessible. A survey should be made in each community of all the
attorneys to determine first, which ones ate willing to do volunteer work;
second, what their specialties are; and third, what days and times they
are available. The second step involves maintaining a well-organized
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database of relevant information on volunteers. Appointments can then
be scheduled for them with legal services clients who have problems
that relate to their specialties at the regular Legal Services Agency
office. The volunteers are therefore just as accessible to the clients as
the regular attorneys. The clients are unable to tell the difference. The
volunteer attorneys do not suffer the frustration of having no clients,
irrelevant clients, or long waiting periods with -nothing to do, as can
happen under the old system.
The second purpose of the ten percent funding would be to provide
training to improve the competency of the volunteers. These well co-
ordinated volunteers, however, would not need as much training as they
would be handling cases in fields with which they are already familiar,
rather than generalized poverty law. Additionally, the volunteers could
benefit from materials and workshops that relate their current fields of
practice to the problems of poor people. Thus, a real estate lawyer may
not be completely aware of special statutes and precedents that relate
to poverty tenants, and a lawyer who is an expert on the Commercial
Code may not be completely aware of procedures that relate to poverty
consumers.
Even if this works, it can still be argued that public policy is arbitrary
since the ten percent figure seems to have no foundation. On the contrary,
the ten percent represents approximately the maximum amount that
could possibly be spent on coordinating the accessibility and improving
the competency of the volunteer attorneys. The Legal Services Program
is funded at approximately $300 million a year. Ten percent represents
$30 million. For $30 million, all the coordinating surveys, cardfiles,
training manuals, and workshops necessary can be purchased. A skeptic
might argue that the $30 million taken away from other LSC activities
may mean laying off some regular LSC lawyers or other personnel.
That is true, but if spending $30 million brings in $60 million worth
of accessible and competent volunteer attorneys, then the investment
will have been worth it.
IV. OPTIMIZING COMPROMISES
A. Legal Services for the Poor
Table 3A shows how the ten percent compromise compares with the
other two alternatives. The first two rows of Table 3A are the same as
Table 1A since the scoring of the volunteer and salaried systems have
not changed. On all four criteria, the compromise system does well.
First on inexpensiveness, the compromise system is not as inexpensive
as a volunteer system. It is, however, less expensive than a salaried
system in two ways. It reduces the appropriation for the purely salaried
system by ten percent. More importantly, the ten percent compromise
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produces a better cost/benefit ratio. The cost stays the same at $300
million under both programs. If the amount of valuable attorney labor
goes up as a result of adding the volunteer component, then the total
system, is more economic and is less expensive for the value received,
because there is more attorney labor for the same $300 million. Therefore,
the score of ten percent compromise is assessed at one and one-half on
inexpensiveness, between the two for the volunteer system and the one
for the salaried system.
TABLE 3
The 10 Percent Compromise
A. WITH UNWEIGHTED CRITERIA
Inexpens Accessib Polit.Fe Competen
Volunteer 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
Salaried G 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00
Compromise 1.50 2.00 2.00 2.00
B. WITH CONSERVATIVE VALUES
Inexpens Accessib Polit.Fe Competen
Volunteer 4.00 1.00 4.00 1.00
Salaried G 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Compromise 3.00 2.00 4.00 2.00
C. WITH LIBERAL VALUES
Inexpens Accessib Polit.Fe - Competen
Volunteer 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Salaried G 1.00 4.00 1.00 4.00
Compromise 1.50 4.00 2.00 4.00
NOTES:
1. The alternative ways of providing legal counsel to the poor include:
(1) Volunteer attorneys, favored by the White House;
(2) Salaried government attorneys, favored by the Congress; and
(3) A compromise that involves continuing the salaried system, but
requiring that 10 percent of its funding go to making volunteers
more accessible and competent.
2. The criteria are inexpensiveness, accessibility, political feasibility, and
competence. Each alternative is scored on each criterion on a 1-5
scale.
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3. Conservative values involve giving a weight of 2 to inexpensiveness
and political feasibility when the other criteria receive a weight of
1. Liberal values involve giving a weight of 2 to accessibility and
competence when the other criteria receive a weight of 1.
4. With conservative values, the volunteer system wins over the salaried
system 10 points to 8. The compromise is an overall winner with
11/2 points.
5. With liberal values, the salaried system wins over the volunteer system
10 points to 8. The compromise is an overall winner with 11/2 points.
6. The "10 percent compromise" is thus a super winner in being better
than the original best solution of both the conservatives and the
liberals.
No reduction in accessibility is necessary because of adding volunteers
who meet with poor clients during regular hours at the offices of the
Legal Services Agency. They are thus just as accessible to the clients
as the regular agency attorneys.
Political feasibility tends to be a matter of being on or off and not
so much a matter of degrees. The salaried government attorney system
lacks political feasibility in the sense that it is strongly opposed by the
White House; it has some substantial difficulty getting through both
houses of Congress without considerable anguish and friction; and it
runs into administrative problems due to White House hostility. The
ten percent compromise system has, however, manifested its political
feasibility by not being as strongly opposed by the White House, by
getting through Congress more easily, and by having less administrative
sabotage and turmoil.
As to competency, adding the volunteer component does not sub-
stantially lower the competency if the volunteers work primarily in their
specialties and receive appropriate training. They may sometimes even
add useful specialized knowledge to the regular attorneys who are more
generalists in poverty law.
Given those scores on the compromise row of Table 3A, the ten
percent compromise receives a total score of seven and one-half as
compared to the six of the volunteer system and the six of the salaried
system. Therefore, this compromise has attributes acceptable to both
the conservatives and liberals, and its score reflects acceptance by both
of those groups.
Table 3B shows how the ten percent compromise scores on the four
criteria given the conservative weights which emphasize inexpensiveness
and political feasibility. Table 3B differs from Table 3A in that the
raw scores are doubled on the inexpensiveness column and on the political
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feasibility column. The result is that the volunteer system receives a
score of ten and the salaried system receives a score of eight, as mentioned
in discussing Table lB. Note, however, that the compromise alternative
receives a total score of eleven which is even higher than the previous
first choice using conservative values.
Table 3C shows how the ten percent compromise scores on the four
criteria given the liberal weights which emphasize accessibility and
competence. Table 3C differs from Table 3A in that the raw scores
are doubled on the accessibility and competency columns. The result is
that the volunteers receive a score of eight, salaried attorneys receive
a score of ten, and the compromise system receives a still higher score
of eleven and one-half using liberal values.
This is an excellent illustration of the concept of an optimizing
compromise which is an additional alternative rather than the previous
first choice of either set of disputants using their own values to weight
the criteria and their own perceptions to score the alternatives on the
criteria. Acceptable compromises that are everybody's second choice
are often difficult to achieve, although the P/G% microcomputer pro-
gram does facilitate such compromises by clarifying the criteria, the
alternatives, the relations, and especially the effects of changing any of
those components on the conclusion as to which alternative is best. The
incremental difficulty of achieving optimizing compromises should be
more than offset by the incremental gain in terms of satisfying con-
servative and liberal disputants, and in terms of benefitting the recipients
of the public policies that are adopted.
B. Optimizing Solutions in Criminal and Civil Cases
In addition to the optimizing solutions presented in the legal services
for the indigent example, it is also possible to present optimizing or
win-plus solutions in other legal disputes. A win-plus solution is one in
which both sides come out ahead of their best expectations, not just
ahead of their worst expectations. The latter is sometimes referred to
as a win-win solution or a Pareto optimum, rather than an optimizing
solution. Win-plus soluions are facilitated by microcomputers because
microcomputers allow for easy trial-and-error experimenting until the
type of solution is achieved. 12
Suppose in a criminal case, the prosecutor's optimum position is a
five year sentence. That means the prosecutor considers five years to
12. The so-called win-win solution is where both sides come out ahead of their worst
expectations and they feel pleased because they were willing to give in more than they
did. This is in contrast to a win-plus solution where both sides come out ahead of their
best expectations. For more on the win-win concept, see R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING
TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981); S. NAGEL & M. NEEF,
DECISION THEORY AND THE LEGAL PROCESS (1979).
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be the maximum realistic number of years that the defendant would
be willing to spend in prison. Five years may be less than the maximum
which the statute allows. If five years is the prosecutor's optimum, then
the prosecutor might be willing to settle for as little as two years. On
the other hand, the defendant's optimum might be one year as the best
possible settlement. That means the defendant might be willing to settle
for as much as three years in prison.
An optimizing solution would thus be one which allows the prosecutor
to have a settlement of more than five years and allows the defendant
to have a settlement of less than one year. That seems impossible, but
not necessarily so if the disputants can move on to a different settlement
dimension, such as community service. On that dimension, an agreement
may be reached in which the defendant agrees to serve ten years in a
monastery. From the prosecutor's point of view, that may be better than
five years in prison. From the defendant's point of view, that might be
better than one year in prison. Thus, ten years of monastic community
service is an optimizing compromise where both sides feel they have
come out ahead of their original optimum positions.
Likewise, in a damages case, the plaintiff may initially demand
$100,000, anticipating that amount to be substantially higher than the
defendant would ever be willing to pay. The defense side, on the other
hand, might initially offer $10,000, anticipating that amount to be
substantially lower than the plaintiff would ever be willing to settle for.
An optimizing compromise would be one in which the plaintiff gets the
equivalent of more than $100,000 and the defendant pays the equivalent
of less than $10,000. That kind of settlement also seems impossible,
but again not necessarily so if the disputants can move on to a different
settlement dimension, such as a performance agreement.
Under a performance agreement, the defendant might be willing to
promise to comply with certain quality standards in the workplace, in
medical practice, or in product manufacturing. The defendant might
consider such an agreement to be a victory because of favorable publicity
over his competitors by entering into such an agreement. The plaintiff
might also consider such an agreement to be a victory because of the
benefits received by the plaintiff's constituents. In that sense, the de-
fendant may feel he is getting more than $100,000 worth of benefits.
The plaintiff may, however, feel he is losing less than $10,000, and is
actually gaining something of net value.
Table 4 shows computer printouts that were generated by a computer
program called Best Choice which can process a set of alternatives being
considered, criteria for evaluating them, and relations between alter-
natives and criteria in order to arrive at optimizing or win-plus solutions.
In the civil case, the object is to find a win-plus alternative that will
be considered by the plaintiff to be higher than receiving $100,000,
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TABLE 4
Finding A Win-Plus Solution In Civil and Criminal Cases
I. THE CIVIL CASE
A. THE ALTERNATIVES AND THE CRITERIA
Alternative Criterion Meas. Unit Weight
1 P's Best >$100,000 1 P's Happiness 1-5 Scale 1.00
2 D's Best <$20,000 2 D's Happiness 1-5 Scale 1.00
3 A Win + Solution
B. SCORING EACH ALTERNATIVE ON EACH CRITERION
P's Happ D's Happ
P's Best >$100,000 4.00 1.00
D's Best <$20,000 1.00 4.00
A Win + Solution 5.00 5.00
C. THE OVERALL SCORES OF EACH ALTERNATIVE
Combined
Rawscores
P's Best >$100,000 5.00
D's Best <$20,000 5.00
A Win + Solution 10.00
I. THE CRIMINAL CASE
A. THE ALTERNATIVES AND THE CRITERIA
Alternative Criterion Meas. Unit Weight
1 P's Best 10 Years 1 P's Happiness 1-5 Scale 1.00
2 D's Best Probation 2 D's Happiness 1-5 Scale 1.00
3 A Win + Solution
B. SCORING EACH ALTERNATIVE ON EACH CRITERION
P's Happ D's Happ
P's Best 10 Years 4.00 1.00
D's Best Probation 1.00 4.00
A Win + Solution 5.00 5.00
C. THE OVERALL SCORES OF EACH ALTERNATIVE
Combined
Rawscores
P's Best 10 Years 5.00
D's Best Probation 5.00
A Win + Solution 10.00
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and be considered by the defendant to be lower than paying $20,000.
In the criminal case, the object is to find a win-plus alternative that
will be considered by the prosecutor to be better than a ten year
sentence, and be considered by the defendant to be better than probation.
In both types of cases, the combination of the plaintiff's happiness and
the defendant's happiness is the overall goal to be maximized in order
to facilitate out-of-court settlements. Both goals are measured on one
through five scales with equal weight. The plaintiff's original best
alternative would make the plaintiff quite happy, but the defendant
quite unhappy, whereas the defendant's original best alternative would
have the opposite effect in either the civil or criminal case. These are
two possible reactions.
First, plaintiff considers that solution to be worth more than $100,000
because the plaintiff feels he will live to about the age of eighty-five
and thus accumulate $200,000. Second, defendant considers that solution
to be worth less than $20,000 because the plaintiff is only forty-five
and may never live to sixty-five, the plaintiff may live to sixty-five but
not necessarily to eighty-five, and $20,000 can be invested now at ten
percent a year, and it will be worth $135,000 by the time the plaintiff
reaches age sixty-five and $405,000 by the time the plaintiff reaches
eighty-five minus the effect of payments of $10,000 per year.
Such optimizing or win-plus solutions can often be provided in civil
cases by talking in terms of whatever product the defendant has to
offer. Most defendants in civil cases do sell something like insurance,
municipal transportation, automobiles, or something else of value. For
example, when General Motors is sued, they might be quite willing to
give the plaintiff a Cadillac or a certificate for a lifetime of Chevrolets
or other GM cars. The total variable cost to General Motors may be
quite small. The monetary benefit to the plaintiff may be quite large
in terms of money saved or the resale value of the automobiles. Likewise,
when the Chicago Transit Authority is sued, they could sometimes offer
valuable lifetime passes for the plaintiff and his family members. The
variable cost to the CTA is almost nothing, whereas the monetary benefit
to the plaintiff might be quite substantial. Thus, getting away from the
exchange of money and into other criteria, especially products or services
of the defendant, can lead to dispute resolutions in which all sides gain
more than their best expectations, rather than merely more than their
worst expectations. 3
The win-plus solution in the criminal case might involve the defendant
13. On the settlement of civil cases out of court, see S. NAGEL & M. NEEF, DECISION
THEORY AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 141-46 (1977); L. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT
(1970); Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,
2 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1973).
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agreeing to commit himself to a long-term non-prison institutionalization,
such as being part of a disease research program in a monastery or
leper colony. The possible reactions are first, the prosecutor might find
that solution to be worth more than ten years in prison if more than a
ten year commitment exists, especially since a ten year prison sentence
may mean release after five years or less with time off for good behavior.
The prosecutor might be especially happy since the state does not pay
for monastery incarceration, and the maximum sentence specified in
the statute is ten years. Second, the defendant might find that solution
better than probation because no plea of guilty exists, and because the
defendant's personality and aspirations may find pleasure in monastery
life or even martyrdom to disease research. 4
The increase in use of community-based corrections and intensive
probation is making possible more win-plus solutions in criminal cases.
Often, a community-based correction for a long term is considered to
be severe from the prosecutor's perspective and to save the county
money on the other side from the defendant's perspective, such a
disposition may be lenient compared to going to prison regardless how
short the time is. Military service has in the past often resulted in
optimizing compromises. Requiring a 19-year-old defendant to join the
army was considered a form of long-term community service by the
prosecutor with no cost to the county. It was, however, considered more
desirable than going to prison from the defendant's perspective. Such
optimizing compromises may facilitate obtaining plea bargains, but if
they are viewed as being too lenient from the defendant's perspective,
they may interfere with the deterrent purpose of criminal sentencing. 15
14. The win-plus or optimizing solution should be distinguished from the so-called
"super-optimum" goal or solution. A super-optimum solution refers more to legislation
than to litigation or negotiation. It refers to goals that are higher than the traditional
optimum. For example, the traditional optimum in unemployment legislation is to reduce
unemployment down to zero or near zero. A super-optimum solution in effect seeks to
go beyond zero by not only providing jobs for all those in the labor force who are
unemployed, but also by adding to the labor force people who are otherwise considered
unemployable or not seeking jobs. That includes the elderly, the handicapped, and unmarried
women with young children. Such a super-optimum solution might also involve providing
full-time jobs for the part-time employed or underemployed who are seeking full-time
jobs, but who are not listed as unemployed. Likewise, a super-optimum goal or solution
in the unemployment context might involve providing second jobs for those who would
like to have them, but who are not listed as unemployed if they already have one job.
For applications to other fields of public policy, see S. Nagel, Doing Better than the
Optimum (unpublished paper available from the author, 1987).
15. On the settlement of criminal cases through plea bargains, see D. NEWMAN,
CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966);
A. RossErr & D. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT: PLEA BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN
COURTHOUSE (1976); Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84
YALE L.J. 1179 (1975); Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI.
L. REV. 50 (1968); Nagel & Neef, Plea Bargaining Decision Theory, and Equilibrium
Models, 51, 52 IND. L.J. 987, 1 (1976).
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C. Other Public Policy Examples
Examples of optimizing compromises involving emotional public policy
disputes arise in various other fields. For example, in the field of criminal
justice, considerable controversy has arisen concerning the manner in
which to draft sentencing legislation. Generally, conservatives are es-
pecially concerned with obtaining severe sentences. Liberals have tra-
ditionally been concerned with rehabilitative sentences. Both sides can
be considered as optimizing winners under the new determinate sent-
encing which many states have adopted. Conservatives have succeeded
in obtaining more severe sentences on the average, since the new
determinate sentencing often provides for mandatory minimums or rel-
atively high determinate sentences as part of legislative bargaining, or
both. Conservatives have also received a bonus of greater objectivity in
the sentencing by virtue of the lessened sentencing discretion and the
greater predictability of sentences. Liberals have gained a more reha-
bilitative system by virtue of the emphasis now placed on community-
based corrections, including supervised work-release programs. Liberals
have also received the bonus of greater objectivity, with reduced dis-
parities along racial, class, sex, and other lines.' 6
Pretrial release is another example. Conservatives emphasize the need
for getting a higher percentage of defendants to appear in court without
committing crimes between arrest and trial. Their previous first choice
was high holding rates as a pretrial release policy. Liberals emphasize
the need for enabling defendants to be able to establish their innocence
and to avoid the bitterness generated by pretrial detention. The liberals'
previous first choice was low holdiig rates as a pretrial release policy.
Both sides are optimizing winners with the new bail reform systems
which emphasize screening, supervising, notifying, selectively prosecut-
ing, and reducing delay. Those reform measures please conservatives
because they result in higher appearance-rates without crime committing
in the interim while saving taxpayer money by having less pretrial
holding. Those reform measures also please liberals because they result
in low holding-rates without an undesirable increase in no-shows and
crime-committers.17
16. On the debate over determinate sentencing and sentencing reform, see D. CURTIS,
TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE RE-
FORM (1977); A. DERSHOWITZ, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); R. SINGER, JUST
DESSERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESSERT (1979); Nagel & Levy, The
Average May Be the Optimum in Determinate Sentencing, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 583
(1981).
17. On the debate over pretrial release, see W. THOMAS, A DECADE OF BAIL REFORM
(1976); P. WICE, FREEDOM FOR SALE: A NATIONAL STUDY OF PRETRIAL RELEASE (1974);
Nagel, Neef & Schramm, Decision Theory and the Pre-Trial Release Decision in Criminal
Cases, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1433 (1977).
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The housing and urban development field is another example of
compromises that have been developed which appeal to both conserv-
atives and liberals. Until recently, conservatives have been largely op-
posed to government programs to provide housing for the poor, arguing
that the marketplace could adequately cover the needs involved. Like-
wise, until recently, liberals have been in favor of public housing projects,
arguing they were needed because the marketplace could not adequately
provide housing for the poor. Both sides felt quite emotional about the
subject, as indicated in the congressional debates over public housing
from the 1930s to the 1970s. During the 1970s, however, new ways of
providing government involvement were developed. The most important
new approach has been the rent and mortgage supplements. Those
supplements are probably now considered by conservatives to be better
than their original first choice of leaving the matter completely to the
marketplace because the government subsidies convert anti-social poor
people into more respectable tenants and even homeowners; the taxpayer
saves money since the rent supplements cost less than building and
maintaining public housing projects; and the rental market welcomes
the rent subsidies. Rent supplements are now probably considered by
liberals to be better than their original first choice of public' housing
because rent supplements mean more dignity for poor people, and they
mean more scattering of poor people with resulting racial and economic
integration. 8
Such optimizing compromises are possible when the disputants em-
phasize different criteria that can be simultaneously satisfied. That may
more often be the case in dispute resolution than is generally recognized.
The P/G% approach helps bring out more clearly the criteria, weights,
alternatives, constraints, and relations of both sides so as to facilitate
such compromises. A simple example of an optimizing compromise
where the disputants emphasize different criteria would be a situation
where Disputant A wants a red ball, and Disputant B wants a heavy
ball. The optimizing solution is to give them a ball that is red and
heavy. One could, however, arrive at an optimizing compromise where
the disputants all emphasize the same criterion such as color, rather
than different criteria such as color and weight. For example, if Disputant
A wants a red ball and Disputant B wants a blue ball, they could be
given a purple ball. That, however, is just a traditional compromise,
not an optimizing compromise. It just gives them something better than
their worst expectations, not something better than their best expectations.
18. On the debate over public housing and housing for the poor, see N. DORSEN &
S. ZIMMERMAN (eds.), HOUSING FOR THE POOR: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (1967); L.
FREEDMAN, PUBLIC HOUSING: THE POLITICS OF POVERTY (1969); R. MUTH, PUBLIC
HOUSING: AN ECONOMIC EVALUATION (1973).
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An optimizing compromise in that situation might be to give them
a solid gold ball to share. No part of the ball is either red or blue, but
they would probably be overjoyed to sell the solid gold ball for $800,000
and to divide the proceeds to buy all the red and blue balls they might
want. The $800,000 is based on gold selling at $500 an ounce and the
solid gold ball weighing 100 pounds. The Camp David Agreement may
be like the golden ball. Israel wanted control over the West Bank, and
Egypt wanted autonomy for the West Bank. The Agreement in effect
provided both of them with tremendous foreign aid, and the West Bank
was still largely unresolved. Everybody went home happy, and this was
considered the Carter Administration's greatest accomplishment since
the benefits did seem to outweigh the costs for all parties concerned. 19
To keep things in perspective, examples of a more traditional com-
promise are needed which is each side's second choice, rather than an
optimizing compromise which is considered to be better than each side's
first choice. An example is the marketable pollution right in the field
of environmental protection. It involves giving business firms permits
to engage in various units of non-toxic, biodegradable pollution. Low
polluters receive more units than they need, and high polluters receive
less than they want. The high polluters therefore buy permits from the
low polluters to be operating within the law. Doing so is expensive which
causes the high polluters to reduce their pollution, especially if the
purchase means income for a competitor. The previous first choice of
conservatives concerning environmental protection has been reliance on
the marketplace with no governmental regulation. The previous first
choice of liberals has been pollution taxes which would provide incentives
for pollution reduction and provide a clean-up fund. The conservatives
like marketable pollution permits better than pollution taxes because
the permits rely more on the marketplace and less on government
regulation. Liberals like marketable pollution permits better than no
regulation because the permits provide incentives for pollution reduction,
although no funds to municipal or other governments to pay for water
filtration or other clean-up activities.20
Clarification is needed as to how each side's second choice is able
to become the compromise winner. What happens implicitly, although
not explicitly, is a series of paired comparisons. Suppose three alternatives
exist consisting of the conservatives' first choice, the liberals' first choice,
19. On international bargaining, see C. LERCHE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 133-244 (1956); F. SCHUMAN, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 133-81 (1953).
20. On the debate over environmental policy and pollution reduction, see P. DOWNING,
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY (1984); S. KAMIENIECKI, R. O'BRIEN &
CLARKE (eds.), CONTROVERSIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1986); S. NAGEL (ed.)
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (1974); G. RICHARDSON, POLICING POLLUTION: A STUDY OF
REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT (1982).
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and the first choice of those who consider themselves relatively neutral.
Suppose also that the conservatives and liberals are equally strong.
Otherwise, the dispute would not be deadlocked. The first paired com-
parison might involve the conservative against the neutral choice. The
neutral choice would win since it would get the votes of the liberals
and the neutrals. The second comparison might involve the liberal against
the neutral choice. The neutral choice would win again since it would
get the votes of the conservatives and the neutrals. The third comparison
might involve the conservative against the liberal choice. That comparison
would result in a tie if the conservatives and liberals are equally strong
and the neutrals equally divided. If the conservative or liberal choice
does win in this comparison, it will still lose to the neutral or second
choice alternative. Second choice compromises are good for resolving
disputes, but not as satisfying as optimizing compromises that are viewed
as being better by the disputants than their original first choices.
An important point to note is that there is nothing inherently liberal
or conservative about seeking win-plus or optimizing solutions. For
example, both President Ronald Reagan and the 1987 Democratic
presidential contenders believe that through economic growth, segments
of society that might otherwise be conflicting can all be better off. This
includes blacks-whites, males-females, rich-poor, north-south, urban-rural,
and other competing or conflicting groups. President Reagan calls it
Reaganomics or supply-side economics. The Democrats call it industrial
policy. The similarities may be greater than the differences. Both ad-
vocate strong use of tax breaks and subsidies to provide developmental
incentives, although the Democrats may have more strings attached. On
the other hand, traditional conservatism and liberalism tend to be more
zero-sum oriented in the sense that they perceive that gains by one
group are offset by losses of other groups. Thus, the followers of both
Karl Marx and Adam Smith have tended to believe that the poor can
be made better off only or mainly at the expense of the rich. In recent
years, due possibly to new technological developments, the idea of a
growing economic pie with bigger slices for all is becoming increasingly
prevalent, with the key current issues being how best to stimulate that
desired growth. 21
D. Legislative Redistricting
Perhaps one of the best public policy examples for illustrating the
21. On the growth perspective of industrial policy, see A. ETZIONI, AN IMMODEST
AGENDA: REBUILDING AMERICA BEFORE THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1983); R. REICH,
MINDING AMERICA'S BUSINESS: THE DECLINE AND RISE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
(1982). On the growth perspective of Reagonomics and supply-side economics, see V.
CANTO, D. JONES & A. LAFFER, FOUNDATIONS OF SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS (1983); P.
ROBERTS, THE SUPPLY SIDE REVOLUTION (1984).
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relevance of microcomputers to resolving negotiation disputes is legis-
lative redistricting. That is an especially important public policy field
because determining legislative districts determines who the legislators
will be, which in turn has a strong influence on what public policy will
be in a variety of fields.
Legislative redistricting was one of the first public policy fields to
receive the benefits of computer-aided decision-making, when in the
early 1960s the Supreme Court ordered legislatures to redistrict. The
original motivation for using computers was largely a bookkeeping
purpose to keep track of the general population and the number of
Democrats and Republicans each time district lines were experimentally
changed in developing a new districting plan. Soon, however, the com-
puters were being put to use to draw experimental plans in light of
criteria related to equal population per district, contiguity within districts,
and proportionate or disproportionate partisan or ethnic strength.
With both the Democrats and the Republicans having easy access
to user-friendly microcomputers, settlements are facilitated by quickly
showing the representation each side can expect to get in light of given
conditions or districts. That lends itself to traditional compromises of
splitting the difference.
An example of an optimizing compromise was in the 1960s when
the Illinois Republicans wanted more control over certain areas like
northwestern Illinois and suburban Cook County, and the Democrats
wanted more control within the city of Chicago and southern Illinois.
A plan was developed where both sides did get more of what they each
wanted since those were not conflicting criteria.
On the matter of the basic conflict of the percent of the total districts
that would be dominated by Democrats or Republicans, often a shift
in the negotiations to the golden ball of state and city patronage,
contracts, and nominations, enabled both sides to feel they were coming
out ahead. A specific example involved both the Democrats and the
Republicans wanting to control the state in the 1950s. The Democrats
won by getting the Republicans to agree to redistricting before the
occurrence of the key Supreme Court case of Baker v. Carr22 and after
losing the case of Colegrove v. Green.23 They did so by agreeing to put
up a weak candidate against the Republican governor in the 1956
election. The Democrats were thus able to control the state by way of
the redistricted statehouse, and the Republicans were able to control
the state by way of the governor's office. This was an optimizing
compromise because the Republicans were expecting to lose the gov-
ernorship. The Democrats were expecting at best to pick up a few
22. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
23. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
212
[Vol. 2:2 1987]
P/G % AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
House seats. As a result of the at-large election which resulted a few
years later, they came close to capturing 100 percent of the seats. The
only thing that kept them from doing so was that they deliberately did
not run as many candidates as there were seats as a part of a trade
with the state Republicans for favors to Chicago.24
Thus, the redistricting field lends itself to numerous examples of
traditional difference-splitting compromises, optimizing compromises
where each side is seeking different goals, and optimizing compromises
where both sides are initally seeking the same goals, but there is room
for shifting away from the original conflict so that both sides come out
(at least in some important ways) better than their best expectations.
V. OTHER AND GENERAL MICROCOMPUTER-BASED PROCEDURES FOR
RESOLVING DISPUTES
Disputes can often be resolved by adding an alternative, especially
an alternative on a new settlement dimension that results in an optimizing
compromise. Microcomputers and the P/G% program can facilitate the
resolving of disputes by making and testing these and other changes in
the alternatives, the criteria, and the relations. Such microcomputer
programs can also be used to aid in deciding among alternative processes
for resolving disputes.
A. Changing the Alternatives
As for the alternatives, instead of adding one, subtracting an alter-
native might be helpful where more than two alternatives are involved.
For example, by reducing three alternatives to two, a clear runoff may
exist where one of the two alternatives in effect gets an especially large
portion of the votes or points that would otherwise go to the third
alternative. This is particularly true when the percentaging method of
Policy/Goal Percentaging is used to deal with criteria on multiple
dimensions, rather than the raw score approach used in the legal services
example. Even with the raw score approach, the raw scores tend to be
relative. Thus, Alternative B may move from a score of a four to a
five on a one through five scale when Alternative B is just being
compared with Alternative A after Alternative C has been removed.
Related to adding an alternative is the idea of consolidating two or
more alternatives. Doing so in effect creates a new alternative. That
new alternative may be an efficient (competent) compromise if only
two alternatives existed at the same time of the consolidation. If more
24. For further details on the use of computers to facilitate settlements in legislative
redistricting disputes, see S. NAGEL, IMPROVING THE LEGAL PROCESS: EFFECTS OF AL-
TERNATIVES 171-88 (1975); Nagel, Simplified Bipartisan Computer Redistricting, 17
STAN. L. REV. 863 (1965).
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than two alternatives exist, then consolidating can have the beneficial
effect of reducing the number of alternatives.
Related to consolidating is subdividing one alternative into two or
more alternatives. Perhaps one of those newly created alternatives may
be a compromise alternative on which the disputants can agree. If not,
some of the newly-created alternatives might be quickly eliminated as
clearly inferior, thereby clarifying the situation and presenting the
available options in a clearer light. Each time an addition, subtraction,
consolidation, or subdivision occurs, the P/G% program can quickly
show how the new alternatives compare in terms of their overall scores
on the criteria, with regard to either raw scores or percentaging scores.
B. Changing the Criteria
All of the above approaches to making changes in the alternatives
can also apply to making changes in the criteria. For example, a dispute
might be more capable of being resolved by adding a criterion which
brings out that Alternative B is clearly the winner, even though the
two alternatives were originally tied. Likewise, subtracting a criterion
could make Alternative B the winner. The same effect in terms of
clarifying the winner can also occur as a result of consolidating two or
more criteria or as a result of subdividing a criterion.
Unlike the alternatives, the criteria are subject to different weights
to indicate their relative importance, although the alternatives are subject
to different overall scores to indicate their relative importance. The
overall scores of the alternatives, however, are outputs of the analysis,
whereas the weights of the criteria are inputs of the analysis. By changing
those criterion weights, Alternative B may become the winner. Working
with different weights when all the weights were originally the same
can help resolve many disputes, although doing so did not work in the
legal services example. Along related lines, weights and criteria of the
first disputant and the second disputant can be worked on separately.
Doing so generates two sets of overall scores for the alternatives. These
scores can be averaged in order to see which alternative might be a
winner. The averaging can be a weighted average if one side of the
dispute is considered to have more weight or to be entitled to more
votes than the other sides or other disputants. This system has flexibility
to work with many different situations.
Working with minimum and maximum constraints is another approach
that especially applies to the criteria, although it could apply to the
alternatives. For example, the subject matter of a given dispute may
cause the disputants to agree that a certain criterion is desirable such
as age of the person to be hired, but only up to seventy years because
of a relevant retirement rule. That could eliminate some alternatives as
could a minimum requirement of age twenty-one. Likewise, the subject
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matter of a given dispute may make it meaningful to have a maximum
and/or minimum constraint on an alternative. Perhaps, for example, the
original alternatives are spending $100 on Activity P and $10 on Activity
Q versus spending $90 on Activity P and $30 on Activity Q. The
alternatives under consideration may be reduced if there is a maximum
budget of no more than $115, a maximum expenditure on an activity
of no more than $90, or a minimum expenditure on an activity of no
less than $20. The P/G% program allows one to determine quickly the
effects of changing minimum and maximum constraints on criteria and
alternatives, as well as changing the criteria and the alternatives
themselves.
C. Changing the Relations
In resolving disputes, the third area of potential change involves the
relations between the alternatives and the criteria. What begins as a
tie could possibly be resolved by changing the scores for some of the
relations. One could also show the overall summation scores for the
alternatives when all the relations are scored from a conservative per-
spective and a liberal or other perspective. Those two or more sets of
overall scores can be averaged in order to arrive at an overall winner.
Along similar lines, the relations can be changed by providing for
more refined measurement as when one goes from a one, two scale to
a one through five scale, or less refined but clearer measurement as
when one goes from a one through five scale to a one, two scale. The
measurement units can be changed from a one through five scale to a
scale measured in dollars, years, miles, or another dimension. Changing
the measurement scale may require shifting from a raw score approach
to a percentaging approach if multi-dimensionality is introduced. For
example, although the raw scores on the two criteria can be added,
both of which are measured on one through five scales, the raw scores
from the one through five scale cannot be added to the scores from a
scale measured in miles. It may, however, be meaningful to indicate
how each alternative scores on each criterion in terms of the percentage
relation of each raw score to the maximum raw score as possible or to
the total of the raw scores on a criterion. The P/G% program works
especially well with such multi-dimensionality in view of the program's
emphasis on working with part/whole percentages of raw scores converted
into percentages of the total points on a criterion.
VI. USING P/G% TO DECIDE AMONG METHODS FOR RESOLVING
DISPUTES
A. General Aspects of Deciding Among Alternative Procedures
The discussion thus far has emphasized how P/G% can be used to
resolve disputes, especially by quickly showing the disputants the effects
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of changing the alternatives, the criteria, and the relations between
alternatives and criteria. P/G% can also aid by showing the disputants
the relevant benefits minus costs of alternative methods for resolving
disputes. This involves two levels of dispute resolution. The lower level
might be referred to as subject-matter dispute resolution, where the
alternatives could be volunteer-attorney system versus salaried-govern-
ment attorneys. The higher level might be referred to as process dispute
resolution, where the alternatives relate to deciding among processes for
resolving the subject-matter dispute resolution in question.
As mentioned earlier, the basic processes for resolving legal disputes
are negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication. A frequent
choice that has to be made is between a negotiated settlement and
going to trial or adjudication. The P/G% program is especially useful
under those circumstances. The settlement offer may be $5,000. The
average trial damages in a similar cases may be $6,000, including cases
in which no damages existed. The percentage fee from a settlement
may be twenty percent or $1,000, whereas the percentage fee from a
trial may be forty percent or $2,400. A trial, however, may be more
expensive to the lawyer who is deciding between these alternative dispute
resolution processes. The attorney may predict only ten hours of work
to close the settlement, figuring such office time is worth $30 an hour
for a total of $300. The attorney may predict twenty-five hours of work
to try the case, figuring trial time at $60 an hour for a total of $1,500.
That means the predicted net profit from settling is $1,000 minus
$300 for a net of $700, whereas the predicted net profit from trying
the case is $2,400 minus $1,500 for a net of $900. There is thus a
$200 gap between the benefits minus costs of the trial alternative versus
the negotiation alternative. The P/G% program can facilitate choosing
between those two alternatives by indicating for each settlement input
item how it would have to change to bring the settlement profit up
from $700 to $900. The program also shows how each trial input item
would have to change to bring the trial profit down from $900 to $700.
That information can be quite helpful in answering such specific questions
as how much does the settlement offer have to increase to make
settlement more profitable than trial, how much room for error is there
on each of the trial items before going to trial becomes less profitable
than settling, and how much would we have to cut our hours, cut the
hourly cost, or increase the percentage fee to make settlement as
profitable as going to trial.
Many variations on those basic ideas exist including changing the
fee-paying arrangement from a percentage fee. If the case involves an
hourly fee, then the total benefits equal the number of hours multiplied
by the hourly fee. If the case involves a flat fee, then the total benefits
equal the flat fee. Second, type of lawyer can be changed from a
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plaintiff lawyer to a defense lawyer. If the lawyer is a defense lawyer,
then the damages and the probability of paying them represent cost
items, rather than benefit items. Third, the perspective can be changed
from lawyer to client. The client perspective requires taking into con-
sideration only the benefits and costs that affect the client. In the above
example, the client receives eighty percent of the $5,000 settlement,
but only sixty percent of the $6,000 trial award. The client may thus
be better off with the settlement alternative, even though the lawyer is
better off with the trial alternative. Fourth, a change can be made from
civil to criminal cases. Doing so means introducing a non-monetary
criterion since prosecutors seek long sentences, not large damages, and
defense attorneys seek short sentences, not small damages. The P/G%
program is especially designed to deal with multi-dimensional criteria
like years and dollars through its provision for part/whole percentaging.
The choice of negotiation versus trial can also be changed to other
controversies relevant to choosing the best method of dispute resolution.
Some of the other choices include: arbitration versus trial, two-sided
negotiation versus bringing in an outside mediator, binding versus non-
binding arbitration, jury trial versus bench trial, federal court versus
state court, appellate court versus staying with the trial court decision,
and any other choices involving two or more alternative methods of
dispute resolution.
In those choices, the decision-makers want to choose the alternative
that will maximize the benefits minus costs of themselves, their clients,
society, or some combination of those interests. In those choices, monetary
and non-monetary benefits and costs will exist. The P/G% program is
general enough to be able to handle any of those seven choices, four
types of goals, and two types of measurements, provided that the decision-
maker is capable of roughly expressing the criteria for choosing among
the alternatives and the relations between the alternatives and the criteria.
The decision-maker does not have to be extremely precise because often
a substantial insensitivity range around each input item exists. That
means the numerical value of each input item can generally move up
or down substantially without affecting which alternative method of
dispute resolution will maximize the decision-maker's benefits minus
costs. 25
25. For examples of P/G% and other quantitative analysis in deciding among alternative
methods of dispute resolution, see Nagel, Lawyer Decisionmaking and Threshold Analysis,
36 U. MIAMi L. REV. 615 (1982); Staller, The Advantages of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Tort Cases, 31 PRAc. LAW. 57 (1985).
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TABLE 5
Comparing Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution
A. HOW THE THREE ALTERNATIVES SCORE ON FOUR CRITERIA
Alternative
Adjudication
Arbitration
Mediation
Delay
1.00
2.50
2.50
Finality
2.00
3.00
1.00
Mutual B
1.00
2.00
3.00
Initiate
3.00
2.00
1.00
Combined
Rawscores
7.00
9.50
7.50
B. COMPARING ADJUDICATION WITH ARBITRATION
Adjudication Arbitration Weight
Delay 3.50 0.00 -0.667
Finality 4.50 0.50 -1.500
Mutual Benefit 3.50 -0.50 -1.500
Initiate-Consent 5.50 -0.50 3.500
C. COMPARING ARBITRATION WITH MEDIATION
Arbitration Mediation Weight
Delay 0.50 4.50 ??
Finality 1.00 3.00 -0.000
Mutual Benefit 0.00 5.00 3.000
Initiate-Consent 0.00 3.00 -1.000
D. COMPARING ADJUDICATION WITH MEDIATION
Adjudication Mediation Weight
Delay 1.50 2.00 0.667
Finality 2.50 0.50 1.500
Mutual Benefit 1.50 2.50 0.750
Initiate-Consent 3.50 0.50 1.250
B. PIG % Applied to Adjudication Versus Arbitration Versus Mediation
Table 5 uses the P/G% approach to compare three basic alternative
procedures for resolving disputes, including adjudication, arbitration, and
mediation. The essence of each alternative is the following:
1. Adjudication involves a full-time judge, not chosen by the parties,
who can issue a binding order, but subject to appeal.
2. Arbitration involves an ad hoe conductor of a hearing, who is
chosen by the parties, and who can issue a binding order.
3. Mediation involves an ad hoc conductor, chosen by the parties,
who can recommend solutions, but who cannot issue a binding order.
There are four criteria used to evaluate these three alternatives. The
criteria are as follows:
1. Being able to avoid delay by involving an ad hoc judge chosen
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for the specific case, rather than having to wait for a judge who hears
a much larger set of cases.
2. Being able to reach a decision that is considered by the parties
to be binding, thereby precluding an appeal.
3. Oriented toward a solution that is mutually beneficial to the
parties, rather than a solution in which one side clearly wins, and the
other side clearly loses.
4. Capable of being initiated by only one side to a dispute without
having to have the cooperation of the other side.
Table 5A shows how each of the three alternatives score on the four
criteria. The scoring system is on a 1-3 scale, where 3 means conducive
to the goal, 2 means neither conducive nor adverse, and 1 means adverse
to the goal. On reducing delay, adjudication is adverse, whereas arbi-
tration and mediation are mildly conducive to delay reduction. On
finality, arbitration scores highest, mediation lowest, and adjudication
in the middle. On emphasizing mutually beneficial solutions, mediation
scores highest, adjudication lowest, and arbitration in the middle. On
allowing an agressive party to take the initiative without the cooperation
of the other side, adjudication scores highest, mediation lowest, and
arbitration in the middle.
Table 5A also shows the overall scores for each of the three alter-
natives. When the four criteria are given equal weight, arbitration scores
highest with an overall score of 9.5 points. This represents the sum of
the separate scores on each of the four criteria. Mediation scores next
to the highest at 7.5, but it is especially down on finality. Adjudication
scores the lowest at 7.0 with approximately a one-point gap in comparison
with arbitration on each of the criteria except taking the initiative.
Table 5B helps answer the question of what it would take to bring
adjudication up to the desirability level of arbitration. The adjudication
column shows that if any one of the adjudication scores were to move
up by 2.5 points, there would be a tie. That, however, is too big a gap
to be overcome by any one score on a 1-3 scale. Likewise, the arbitration
column shows that if any one of the arbitration scores were to move
down by 2.5 points, there would be a tie. That, however, would also
mean going outside the 1-3 scale. A tie could also occur if delay, finality,
or mutual benefit were viewed as having negative value, rather than a
more logical positive value. The only tie-causing value that is feasible
in Table 5B is the 3.5 for the weight of ability to initiate without
consent of the other side. That is the key criterion which favors ad-
judication. If one gives' that criterion a high weight in general or in a
specific case, then adjudication wins over arbitration.
Table 5C helps answer the question of what it would take to bring
mediation up to arbitration. There is a two-point gap to be overcome
in view of the 9.5 score of arbitration and the 7.5 score of mediation.
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That gap could be overcome if arbitration were to score only a 1 on
finality, or if mediation were to score either a 3 on finality or a 3 on
initiate. Those scores are within the 1-3 scale, but they are empirically
unrealistic in view of the nature of arbitration, and mediation. The
weights column shows that no change in the weight of delay would help
since both methods of dispute resolution receive the same score on
delay. If finality were dropped as a ,goal, there would be a tie. If
initiation without consent were considered undesirable, there would be
a tie. Those changes are normatively unrealistic given the usual values
of a legal system. The only tie-causing value that is feasible in Table
5C is the 3.0 for the weight of mutual benefit. That is the key criterion
which favors mediation. If one gives that criterion a high weight in
general or in a specific case, then mediation wins over arbitration.
Table 5D helps answer the question of what it would take to bring
adjudication up to the desirability level of mediation. This is a smaller
gap to overcome since mediation received an overall score of 7.5, and
adjudication received a close score of 7.0. There ar& thus a number of
changes in the adjudication or mediation scores which are within the
1-3 range, and possibly some are within a margin of error or subjective
possibility. Normally, however, the relation scores are much more ob-
jective than the relative weights of the criteria. Those weights show
that if the weight of finality and initiate are raised above the original
weights of 1.0, then adjudication becomes the winner since those are
its relative strengths. If, on the other hand, the weight of delay and
mutual benefit are lowered below the original 1.0, then adjudication
also becomes the winner since those are the relative strengths of me-
diation. This analysis is not only useful for comparing alternative methods
of dispute resolution, but also for obtaining more insights into how the
P/G% software can be helpful in finding the basis for an overall
agreement when there is an initial conflict among alternatives.26
VII. SOME CONCLUSIONS
In light of the above general principles and specific examples, it can
be concluded that microcomputers and the P/G% program help facilitate
negotiation and mediation leading to dispute resolution by proceeding
in accordance with the following steps or options.27
1. Determine the initial alternatives, the criteria, and the relations
26. On mediation as a form of alternative dispute resolution, see J. FLOBERG & A.
TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT
LITIGATION (1984); C. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
RESOLVING CONFLICT (1986); F. SANDER, MEDIATION: A SELECTED ANNOTATED BIB-
LIOGRAPHY (1984).
27. For evaluations of P/G%, see Butler, Nagel Writes Computer Aided Law Decisions
Program, U.S. L. NEWS, Sept., 1986, at 22; Diennor, How Case Evaluation Can Improve
Your Practice, 2 PROFITABLE LAW. 13 (1985); Radeliff, Multi-Criteria Decision Making:
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between the alternatives and the criteria in light of each side's values
and perceptions. The P/G% input-format facilitates clarification of
those dispute parameters.
2. Determine what it would take each side to convince the other side.
The threshold, break-even, or tie-causing analysis of the P/G% pro-
gram facilitates that determination. If each side could at least partly
convince the other side, encourage them to do so, the result may be
a mutually acceptable alternative or compromise.
3. Experiment with a variety of additional alternatives, as contrasted
to the original deadlocked alternatives. Use the P/G% program to
determine quickly the overall or summation score for each alternative
using the criterion weights of each side to the dispute. Look especially
for new alternatives that could be endorsed by both sides more
strongly than their original first choices. At least find an alternative
that could be each side's second choice and thus serve as a compromise
winner in a series of paired comparisons.
4. Try changing the alternatives by subtracting some, by consolidating
two or more, or by subdividing some. Try doing the same things
with the criteria. Use the P/G% program to determine the overall
or summation scores of the new set of alternatives.
5. Try changing the criterion weights, or try averaging the alternatives
in light of the different sets of weights which the conflicting disputants
have.
6. Try working with reasonable minimum and/or maximum constraints
on the criteria and/or the alternatives to see what difference that
makes.
7. Try changing some of the relation scores and maybe the measurement
units on which the scores are based. That may mean experimenting
with the procedures in the P/G% program for dealing with criteria
measured on multiple dimensions.
With this list of ideas and with the aid of the P/G% program, the
negotiator or mediator in a dispute should be able to experiment quickly
with different ideas toward arriving at an optimizing compromise that
will be even better than the disputants' former first choices. This is an
enormous goal to try to achieve. Getting only partly there, however,
may mean more accomplishment in terms of arriving at mutually sat-
isfying solutions than any lesser goal would be capable of achieving. 28
A Survey of Software, 4 Soc. Sci. MICROCOMPUTER REV. 38 (1986); Brunelli, Coin-
flip or Computer? Systemization of Legal Hunches Could be the Ultimate Litigation
Tool, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 21, 1986, at 1, 13.
28. For applications of P/G% to other legal situations, see S. NAGEL, USING PERSONAL
COMPUTERS FOR DECISION-MAKING IN LAW PRACTICE (1985); Nagel, Microcomputers,
Risk Analysis, and Litigation Strategy, 19 AKRON L. REV. 35 (1985); Nagel, Optimum
Sequencing of Court Cases to Reduce Delay, 37 ALA. L. REv. 583 (1986); Nagel,
Sequencing and Allocating Attorney Time to Cases, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1021 (1986);
Nagel, Using Microcomputers and P/G% to Predict Cases, 18 AKRON L. REV. 541
(1985).

